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Aims
1. To provide a brief overview of 
securitisation and the crunch
2. To explain how subprime 
defaults and credit risk 
should have been contained
3. To explore the uneasy 
boundaries between the 
elites of governance and 
financial engineering –
regulator or collaborator?
Methodology
Semi-structured interviews (n=40)
Conducted in 2006-2007
Included senior directors and junior executives in the UK 
Organisations included: mortgages lenders (building societies, 
centralised lenders, banks), investment  banks, asset managers, 
trade bodies, credit referencing agencies, corporate service 
providers, law firms and bond-rating agencies
Respondents sourced from searches of the financial media from 
leading firms identified in the financial press
Securitisation at the heart of the crisis
RMBS Residential Mortgage Backed Securities
Process used to sell bonds as debt
£100k bonds backed by mortgages
Sale of assets
ABS: Asset Backed Securities
Credit cards, consumer loans, commercial property
Capital adequacy ratios
Basel 8 per cent reserves
£1 billion in mortgage assets = 
£80 million
Diversify their funding away 
from other sources, such as 
deposits
Why securitize?
To gain finance to lend and expand market share
Borrow money to issue mortgages via a „warehouse 
line‟ - a huge overdraft
Enabled the repackaging of higher risk subprime loans, 
and into lower risk securities 
Then refinance this overdraft with securitisation
Northern Rock/HBOS did this to become a hybrid
Why securitize?
The „waterfall structure‟
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Financial elites
Financial products are produced at the boundaries of firms (Thrift, 1994)
Until recently, there has been a lack of attention on elites (Savage & 
Williams, 2008; Hall, 2009)
Financialised elites (Hall, 2009)
Capital market intermediaries (Folkman, et al. 2007)
‘Proactive initiators’ investment bankers, corporate lawyers
‘Responsive functionaries‟  bond-rating agencies in governance
Has the role of bond-rating agencies become more blurred?
Have they moved beyond a role of supervision and are they interacting 
more proactively with other elites?
The role of bond-rating elites in  the 
development and operation of 
securitisation
The role of bond-rating agencies in finance
Since the 1980s, financial organisations moved from intermediation to 
disintermediation - where borrowers accessed credit directly from 
investors by issuing bonds, instead of through bank deposits (French & 
Leyshon 2008)
This created the emergence of a new private mode of financial 
surveillance, creating a regime of governance, not government  (Sinclair, 
1994)
Bond-rating agencies provide a key role in providing independent 
metrics, and ratings of the quality of bonds to investors (Sinclair, 1994)
These agencies provide „judgements‟ on bond quality that have  assisted 
the financialisation of Anglo-American economies through their 
judgements (Erturk, et al (2004)
The aim of these metrics has been to calculate estimates that bond issuers 
will default, or not, to overcome information asymmetries (Sinclair, 2005)
This has created a global elite of private governance with private analysts 
that control the metrics provided to bond issuers
Bond-rating agencies emerged in the US and have moved into Europe, Asia 
and Latin America
There are three main agencies that rate the credit quality of bonds globally, 
including corporate bonds, sovereign bonds and securitisation notes
Low
Risk
High
Risk
Standard &
Poor’s AAA AA A BBB BB
Fitch Ratings AAA AA A BBB BB
Moody’s Aaa Aa A Baa Ba
The agencies use the following rating measures for RMBS bonds:
Usually, 90pc of a securitisation is of low risk AAA
Theoretically the same risk as holding a sovereign bond, but 
with a higher yield
Different investors sought bonds of varying risk to meet their 
investment mandates
3 agencies wield considerable power over financial markets
Small global teams with considerable power, especially in London
Before bonds are issued, bond-rating agencies run stress tests 
including the quality of the issuer, liquidity risk, credit risk, repayment 
of the notes
However, the quality of a bond issue is monitored over its lifetime -
increasing and decreasing the rating
Bond-rating agencies have a powerful location within financial 
networks – ratings limit access to investors
Expanding British RMBS markets: The role of bond 
agencies
Bond-rating agencies and their metrics have provided greater 
transparency for investors
Enabling them to compare different bonds and asset classes - especially 
for RMBS
The early UK RMBS market was mainly inhabited by UK investors, 
including banks, insurance companies and pension funds
Reputation was important for investors, as was local knowledge
Most investors undertake due-diligence into RMBS, scrutinising the 
mortgage portfolio, lender and transaction details
Rating agencies assisted the expansion of the UK market by enticing 
international investors
Expanding British RMBS markets: The role of bond 
agencies
International US investors were unsure of the market, but they were 
familiar with US bond-rating agency metrics 
This provided reassurance for investors who began to buy UK assets. 
widening the market to other international investors
This also sped up the market as investors would happily purchase AAA 
bonds, with reduced due-diligence
The introduction of bonds explains why, at the peak of the market, 70 per 
cent of investors in UK RMBS were from overseas (CML 2010)
Bond-rating agencies had facilitated this with the power of their metrics
This enabled the housing market to grow, subprime issuance to increase, 
profitability, for lenders to increase
Critiquing bond-rating elites
If elites conducting surveillance suppose that a bond is weakening, they 
will downgrade the bond. This increases the risk, and often increases 
the interest rate that the issuer must pay to investors
Bodenman (1996) has argued that these metrics, especially 
downgrades, on US municipal bonds have increased the debt of poorer 
cities, increasing the proportion of tax revenues being spent on bond 
repayments, not city services
Ferri et al (1999) have argued that agencies exacerbated the Asian 
Crisis in the 1990s, by downgrading debt on bonds, and increasing bond 
repayments, placing companies under stress, and exacerbating the 
problem into a self-fulfilling prophecy
The reliance on external capital also increased the UK‟s dependence on 
these funds, exacerbating the fallout after the crisis
More recently German Chancellor
Angela Merkel criticised bond-rating
agencies for not classifying US
subprime bonds as high risk
investments
This, she has argued, misled investors
adding to the intensity of the credit
crunch
Understood by many as a conflict of interest between issuers of bonds and 
bond-rating agencies, where the agency fees are paid by issuers,  which 
may have coerced them into providing favourable ratings
Portes (2008) argues that Moody‟s generated 44 % of its revenues 
from rating activities
Questionable that they would rate high-risk assets with low-risk metrics
as it could damage their reputation - problematizes their role as private
governors of global capital markets
Investigating the roles of these elites suggest how agencies were
implicated in the crisis, but did not seek to give over-optimistic ratings
Making finance: Securitisation 
and the confused roles of 
elites? 
Structuring RMBS bonds
The development of RMBS transactions relies on a select group of epistemic 
elites
These include structurers in investment banks that  create the waterfall 
structure and transaction model to develop the note tranching
This model is then stress tested to analyse the effects of different financial 
scenarios, that could be expected, to see how the transaction responds– this 
can include increasing interest rates and unemployment
These elites develop the models, and originally the bond rating agencies 
would then certify their quality and risk, with different ratings
These evaluations of the stability provided independent metrics of private 
governance, but the agencies have become more involved in this process
In practice, this supervisory role becomes more complex
Investment bank structurers „create‟ the securitisation structures
But, if the structure fails to meet the guidelines of the bond-rating agencies, 
the analysts give advice and hints as to how the deal should be amended
Suggests a complex relationship as they move from governor to a role in 
shaping transactions
Then structurers started using the methodologies from bond-rating 
agencies as „cook books‟, or model answers to build their transactions
The RMBS structures became  programmed around the bond-rating 
assumptions
“Yeah, some of them [bond rating analysts] say what you give
us [transaction] we will rate, and then you ask for feedback, so
if in this scenario, where, what can we do to make this
scenario better, it depends on the analyst you‟re working with,
some are more helpful than others, it depends how busy they
are, it‟s a bit of give and take on both sides, and experience,
some banks will know just as well as the agencies, it‟s
experience, that will help, they will say try that around, or this
doesn‟t look right, check your model is working, but there is
give and take on each deal,” (Investment Bank, Structurer
2007)
During the 1990s, methodologies 
used by rating elites were made 
available to structurers to assist 
the structurers in developing their 
waterfall and securitisation 
structures
Created a significant shift in the 
role of these elites from private 
governors to co-producers
„Independent production‟  of  
RMBS began to converge and 
conform on particular  models and 
assumptions of bond-rating 
agencies
Governance and 
Surveillance
Financial Activity
Governance and 
Surveillance
Financial Activity
“…bankers used to model the transaction
and we used to validate the model, and
now we model our own transaction so it’s a
lot more independent and easier to
understand what’s going on with the
transaction, I think that’s the main change,
so we can reconcile our model with the
banker’s model and we know the bank isn’t
hiding anything,” (Bond-rating Analyst,
2007)
“then you get rating agency templates,
which, three different rating agencies have
different things they try to populate... you
get the rating agency reports and then it‟s
run through cash flow models, so it‟s a big
modelling process to come out with, once
you run through all the models, do all the
different stresses each agency has
different stresses, so there‟s, it‟s just CPR
all prepayments from 40% to half a
percent, stress arrears going up to, erm,
it‟s different for different rating categories,
err, if you look at the rating methodology of
the agencies, so it‟s running the cash flow
models, coming out with your loss severity
which would give you a triple A and how
much you would get”, (Investment Bank,
Structurer, 2007)
Summary: The conflicting roles of elites in 
governance
Bond rating agencies should be providing governance of RMBS 
transactions, but their role has become progressively interrelated with 
production
The 3 main bond rating agencies use elite analysts to produce key texts that
were used to develop securitisation structures
Whilst critics have argued that bond-rating agencies provided metrics that
were too low-risk for some transactions, these elites and their
methodologies caused a convergence of the transactions, partially
contributing to their construction
The assumptions and structures of the bond-rating agencies can be 
viewed as a contributor to the crisis, as they guided the engineering that 
underpinned RMBS transactions, especially subprime deals in the US
The European Securitisation Forum (ESF) and the Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)  are arguing for greater 
transparency within the „future‟ securitisation market, and are calling for 
renewed trust in rating agencies
Findings of the research suggest that the relationship between private 
governance and finance is more complex than originally thought
To provide added protection against future financial crisis, this 
complicated relationship needs to be understood in greater detail.
Perhaps the agencies and their models should be scrutinised, but who 
should fulfil that task?
Would  reducing the power of agencies be useful, by forcing more due 
diligence by investors

New directions: new hybrids of 
financial, cultural and religious 
elites
New directions?: Regulatory elites and religious 
finance
A new generation of financial products have co-evolved with 
securitisation using similar features
Shariah finance, known as sukuk bonds
Involved in the Dubai‟s financial downturn, but potentially seen as a 
new method of accessing Islamic finance markets
Subject to bond-rating agency metrics, but also due to Islamic Law
Sukuk are subject to religious oversight – cultural contrast to capitalism
Shariah Law – Principles of 
Banking and Finance
1. The prohibition of Riba
2. The prohibition of Gahar, including 
risk-taking
3. The avoidance of socially responsible  
investments, including gambling and 
alcohol
4. Risk sharing between entrepreneurs 
and financiers
5. Investments into material and 
tangible goods and assets
6. Social justice – where neither party of 
a transaction are exploited
Gait and Worthington (2008:785)
New directions?: Regulatory elites and 
religious finance
Sukuk are rated for credit quality by bond-rating agencies 
Sukuk bonds are governed by Shariah scholars for Shariah 
compliance
The views and opinions of individual scholars and their social position 
as elites provides them with the power to determine the Islamic 
quality of bonds
Sukuk bonds are only rated, as with bond-rating metrics, once these 
powerful elites are satisfied with the quality of bonds
This quality is compliance with Islamic Law, and not just bond rating 
metrics
New directions?: Regulatory elites and religious 
finance
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